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A First Practical Look at ISO/SAE TR 8477:2026: Verification Is Not Testing, Validation Is Not Pentesting

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Five years after the publication of ISO/SAE 21434, most organizations have arrived at giving security its proper place in vehicle development: the TARA is done, the cybersecurity concept is written, the cybersecurity case is worked out in a traceable way. And then comes the question that makes many projects go quiet: how do we actually know that all of this holds up? The usual answer is, “We commissioned a pentest.” Shortly before SOP, of course. This is where ISO/SAE TR 8477:2026 is meant to bring additional clarity. Below, we discuss the document in detail.

Miks Jurjāns

Published in November 2026, ISO/SAE TR 8477:2026 “Road vehicles — Cybersecurity verification and validation” uses 28 pages to sort out what verification and validation (V&V) mean in the context of ISO/SAE 21434, how the two differ, how to plan them, and how to document their results.

This matters because ISO/SAE 21434 lays the groundwork for both, but does so in fewer than ten requirements. ISO/SAE TR 8477 builds on that foundation: it sharpens the line between verification and validation and adds the context and examples needed to apply them consistently in a project. That gap has so far led to late testing, duplicated work, and recurring discussions between OEMs and suppliers.

In this article, we take a detailed look at ISO/SAE TR 8477:2026 and then draw seven takeaways for project practice. We close by comparing it with what we actually see in automotive pentesting practice with BreachLabz.

TL;DR for readers in a hurry: The TR sets no new requirements. What it does provide are the terms and arguments that finally make it possible to plan V&V as a continuous activity instead of a mandatory appointment at the end of the project.

What ISO/SAE TR 8477 Is – and What It Is Not

If the 42 work products of ISO/SAE 21434:2021 already keep you busy enough, rest assured: ISO/SAE TR 8477 is a Technical Report (TR for short), not a standard with requirements.

Accordingly, it contains no “shall” statements, no requirement IDs, and no new work products. The scope (Clause 1) speaks of “considerations” on the planning and execution of V&V for items and components, always in the context of ISO/SAE 21434.

This is important for positioning it in a project: nobody can be audited against the TR. But anyone who has to explain in an audit or a cybersecurity assessment why their V&V strategy looks the way it does will find their reference here.

The introduction of ISO/SAE TR 8477 names four topics:

  1. the V&V strategy,
  2. the methods that can be applied,
  3. the distribution of activities between customer and supplier,
  4. and the logical sequence of activities.

It also makes clear that the TR focuses on strategy and does not prescribe methods. One caveat on the third topic: anyone expecting a fixed split of roles will not find one. The TR dedicates no clause to it and says only that customer and supplier agree on who performs which V&V activity in the cybersecurity interface agreement. What it adds are practical pointers: what the two sides should exchange, when one side can rely on the other’s evidence, and how a supplier’s assumptions are confirmed at integration.

Why Was ISO/SAE TR 8477 Needed?

In ISO/SAE 21434, verification accompanies the entire development. Step by step, it checks whether a work result matches what was specified for it: whether the TARA has been derived completely and correctly from the item definition, whether the cybersecurity concept covers the cybersecurity goals, whether the specifications fit the concept, and whether the implementation ultimately delivers what the specification demands.

Validation starts one level higher. It looks at the item in the vehicle, in series production configuration, and asks whether the cybersecurity goals are adequate and actually achieved, whether the cybersecurity claims hold, and whether no unreasonable risk remains as a result.

What the standard largely leaves open is the how: which methods, at what depth, at what point in time, and by whom. Test methods such as fuzzing or penetration testing are mentioned only as examples in a recommendation.

The regulatory side looks similar. UN R155 requires processes for testing the cybersecurity of a vehicle type and “appropriate and sufficient” testing, but it does not say when a test is sufficient either.

In this gap, practice has developed its own habits. Verification became requirements-based testing, validation became the pentest shortly before SOP. Suppliers wondered what validation “at vehicle level” is supposed to mean for their component, and OEMs and suppliers debated in every project anew who owes whom which evidence.

Assessors, in turn, lacked a common yardstick for judging a V&V strategy.

The need for new industry-wide input was recognized early on. The project was initially set up as a Publicly Available Specification (PAS for short) and then continued as a Technical Report.

In our article Status quo ISO/SAE 21434: A look at the standard three years after publication, we had recorded the questions practitioners asked most frequently at the time. With ISO/SAE TR 8477 now published, they can be answered:

Question from practiceAnswer from TR 8477:2026
Do suppliers verify while OEMs validate?No. Who performs which activity is governed by the cybersecurity interface agreement (4.1).
Is verification just requirements-based testing?No. Verification relates to every level of the requirements hierarchy (4.3.1). Clause 6 names eleven method groups, from review to cryptographic testing.
Is validation just penetration testing?No. Validation relates to the highest level of the hierarchy (4.3.1) and can begin as early as preliminary TARA results (4.4).

Understanding ISO/SAE TR 8477 in Detail: Clauses 4 to 8 at a Glance

The substantive part of the 8477 consists of five clauses and one annex. If you do not have the TR on your desk yet, here is a first overview:

Clause 4: V&V in the Context of Cybersecurity

Clause 4 is the centerpiece. This is where the TR draws the line between the two “Vs,” and it does so by purpose, not by method:

  • Verification asks whether the item or component has been built as specified: whether architecture, design, and ultimately the implementation satisfy the cybersecurity requirements.
  • Validation asks whether the item in the target vehicle is appropriately and sufficiently cybersecure.

To support this, the TR introduces a new term: the conceptual cybersecurity requirement, meaning a requirement derived directly from a cybersecurity goal. This is a label, not new content: ISO/SAE 21434 uses “cybersecurity requirement” for both the concept level and the specification level, and the TR needs to tell the two apart in order to say what validation covers.

The rest of the clause works through the consequences: the relation to the requirements hierarchy and to the architectural layers, the logical sequence, functional and non-functional properties, the relation with the TARA, the impact of refinement, the handling of assumptions, and the familiar special cases of reuse, out-of-context, and off-the-shelf.

Clause 5: V&V Strategy and Planning

Clause 5 describes what a V&V strategy can contain:

  • scope and interfaces,
  • what the activities intend to establish,
  • the selected methods and the rationale for them,
  • and the references to the cybersecurity plan and cybersecurity interface agreements (both frequent candidates for ISO/SAE 21434 templates).

The planning itself is part of the cybersecurity plan and ranges from entry and exit criteria to prioritization and the management of findings.

Nothing groundbreaking here. As a checklist for your own strategy, the clause is still a good starting point.

Clause 6: Method Groups to Choose From in the V&V Strategy

There really is more here than requirements-based testing and pentesting. Clause 6 presents eleven method groups: review, analysis, formal method, code analysis, functional testing, vulnerability scanning, fuzz testing, stress testing, fault injection, penetration testing, and cryptographic testing.

One important point: the TR explicitly makes no recommendation for or against any method.

For the details, almost every subclause refers to SAE J3322:2025, including the relevant sections there. If you want to know how to actually carry out a method, that is where you need to keep reading.

Clause 7: Examples of Application

Clause 7 brings methods and subjects together. Five tables show which method is applied to what, and for what purpose:

  • TARA,
  • assumptions and cybersecurity claims,
  • cybersecurity goals,
  • cybersecurity concept, including the conceptual cybersecurity requirements,
  • cybersecurity requirements, including design and specification.

Each table follows the same three-part pattern: method, applied to, purpose.

The idea is to make the abstract method groups of Clause 6 tangible using concrete work products of ISO/SAE 21434. The purpose column shows in each case whether an activity verifies or validates, which makes visible that the same method can serve both aims. The examples are also meant to demonstrate that V&V does not start with the finished product but well before it: with the TARA, the assumptions, and the concept. The TR explicitly states that the tables are not exhaustive. They are intended as impulses for your own V&V strategy, not as a catalog to be worked through.

Our first impression of the quality of this collection is somewhat mixed.

The list is certainly long and useful as a source of ideas for your own strategy, particularly for assumptions and cybersecurity claims (Table 2).

Some entries, however, remain so generic that they tell experienced teams little that is new. That source code fuzzing verifies the implementation of a software unit is correct, but it hardly helps anyone apply the method.

Clause 8: V&V Reporting

Clause 8 concludes by describing what a V&V report can contain – a topic that still gives the industry headaches far too often. It names:

  1. a) traceability,
    b) scope,
    c) results and findings,
    d) deviations from the plan,
    e) and a conclusion.

This is not a binding template but a framework for what a report should answer at a minimum: What was examined, with what, to what extent, with what result, and what follows from it?

The TR deliberately stays at a high level, but it includes three example excerpts that make the framework tangible: a fuzzing report for a body control module, and an intermediate and a final validation report for a window lifter.

This is helpful above all because this is where the biggest gap exists in practice. Testing usually happens, but the report then lacks the link back to the specific target, the scope of the method used remains unclear, and the connection to the other work products is lost.

Teams that follow the structure of the TR get reports that the cybersecurity case can refer to and that an assessment can follow without having to go back to the test team with questions.

Annex A of ISO/SAE TR 8477: How V&V Differs From the Cybersecurity Assessment

Annex A, the only annex, clears up a misunderstanding we regularly encounter in projects.

V&V activities generate evidence.

The cybersecurity assessment, in turn, judges independently whether this evidence and the rationales are sound and convincing.

The 8477 calls this a second opinion based on the four-eyes principle: the assessment is not intended to repeat development activities or to generate evidence of its own.

A side-by-side comparison in table form makes the difference concrete:

  • For the TARA, for example, development verifies that a risk treatment decision has been made for each threat scenario.
  • The assessment, by contrast, asks whether the rationale for an accepted risk holds and whether any implicit assumptions remain.

Or for the verification report:

  • Here, the V&V activity consists of documenting the strategy, the evidence, the findings, and the overall result.
  • The assessment, in turn, judges whether the strategy is sound, whether the evidence is convincing, and whether the findings have been properly followed up.

This distinction is useful for two reasons. It protects against duplicated work, because an assessment is explicitly not meant to repeat development activities or generate its own evidence. And it does away with the expectation that a passed pentest already is the assessment, or conversely, that the assessor will make up for any missing tests.

Seven Takeaways From ISO/SAE TR 8477 for Project Practice

Having looked at the content of ISO/SAE TR 8477, the question is: what follows from it for your own project?

Bringing the individual sections of the Technical Report together produces a clear picture: V&V is not meant to be a test phase at the end, but to accompany development from the first TARA through to the release for post-development.

That shifts quite a few things in day-to-day work: tests move forward, assumptions need evidence, and the division of tasks between customer and supplier is clarified up front. How much of this is needed in an individual case, the TR does not say. It describes possibilities, not obligations.

The following seven points are therefore our interpretation of ISO/SAE TR 8477: what the TR says and what can be taken from it for practice.

1. Purpose Separates the Two Vs, Not Method

A fuzzing run can be verification. The same fuzzing run can also be part of a validation. The introduction of the TR puts it plainly: the objectives differ, the methods can be identical or similar.

 VerificationValidation
Guiding questionAre we building the cybersecurity of the item or component right?Are we building the right item regarding cybersecurity?
Checkswhether architecture and design satisfy the cybersecurity requirementswhether the item in the target vehicle is appropriately and sufficiently cybersecure
Levelany level of the requirements hierarchythe highest level: cybersecurity goals, conceptual cybersecurity requirements, requirements allocated to the operational environment, assumptions, cybersecurity claims
Architectureany architectural layerany architectural layer, because any layer can violate a goal

Two details are easily overlooked:

  1. First, verification results can feed into validation, so the two activities build on each other.
  2. Second, at higher architectural layers validation can already start where controls are not yet detailed enough to be implemented. In that case you validate the concept, not the product.

An example makes the difference tangible: an infotainment language module in five European languages can meet every requirement and still fail validation if the target market is China.

For planning, this means that every activity in the cybersecurity plan should state which of the two purposes it serves.

2. Validation Starts Early, Not Three Weeks Before SOP

For us, this is the most important statement in the TR. An activity can start as soon as its inputs are available. For validation, that means it can begin on the basis of preliminary architecture and preliminary TARA results, is updated during development, and is concluded before the release for post-development.

The TR makes an effort to stay realistic here. Preliminary inputs are sufficient for some validation activities, not for all. Early evidence is re-affirmed or enriched later, for example when a prototype or the final TARA becomes available. And because validation relates to the series production configuration, there are preliminary reports and a final one at release. If acceptance criteria are not yet available at an early stage, you work with documented assumptions, such as a preliminary attack feasibility rating.

The TR supplies the reasoning along with it: the later a finding surfaces, the harder it is to address, especially if functionality has to be modified to do so. (We have been preaching this for years.)

For V&V strategy and planning, the TR uses the term “shifting left.” Controls that are difficult to change late in development are verified first. Conceptual cybersecurity requirements with a potential for abuse are validated first, such as secure boot, the over-the-air update client, or the immobilizer PIN.

Early validation is not additional effort; it is simply effort placed somewhere else. We have explained elsewhere why this pays off: Cybersecurity in vehicle development is not an end in itself – it is a lever for reducing costs.

3. The TARA Is Alive, and V&V Keeps It Alive

In a dedicated subclause, the TR describes the relation between TARA and V&V as a loop. Weaknesses from the design are analyzed, and the resulting vulnerabilities flow back into the risk assessment. (Modern software platforms such as CYMETRIS already map this loop today.)

Conversely, the TARA relies on properties of the item, and those are exactly what validation has to confirm: that they are implemented, that they are as effective as assumed, and that the underlying assumptions are valid.

The TR’s example: an attack feasibility rating relies on secure boot. If secure boot is not implemented or is less effective than assumed, the rating is invalid. The same applies to procedures that are supposedly described in a manual, and to controls outside the item. Clause 4.5 adds non-functional properties: if a concept relies on a processing load limit, for instance, verification can uncover that this property was never implemented or is no longer implemented after a design change.

Clause 4.7 names three triggers for updating work products:

a) a finding,
b) a change to the item,
c) or a refinement.

The TR’s PIN example shows the loop in six steps: a PIN code is introduced as a control, the updated TARA discovers a new path for abuse in it, the risk is not accepted, a PIN rate limit closes the gap, and validation confirms it.

This example in ISO/SAE TR 8477 shows what matters when cybersecurity work products are refined: a single design decision touched the TARA, the risk assessment, the design, and validation in turn. This is exactly what ISO/SAE 21434 means when it requires work products to remain consistent with one another up to the release for post-development. From this, the TR derives a clear order: first clarify the impact of a change on the other work products, then bring the V&V activities up to the updated state.

Without functioning change and configuration management, this loop cannot be closed cleanly.

Two things have proven their worth here:

  1. Re-check TARA results and project assumptions before overall validation, because by then they are often two years old.
  2. Give every rating value a short rationale. Only then will validation know later what the rating was based on. (More on this here: Is the TARA (Not) Traceable? A Critical Assessment from Item Definition to ALM and Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA): 5 weaknesses from a practitioners’ point of view)

4. Claims and Assumptions Need to Be Put to the Test

Let’s be honest: in many projects, cybersecurity claims and assumptions are primarily the place to file everything nobody wants to solve themselves. “The OEM takes care of that.” “The vehicle never has an always-on telematics unit.” Written down, filed away, never touched again.

The TR puts an end to that. Validation explicitly relates to assumptions and cybersecurity claims as well. Assumptions are documented in the respective work product and checked.

The TR distinguishes:

  • Assumptions that influence goals or conceptual cybersecurity requirements are validated.
  • Others, for example from an out-of-context development, can be verified.

At its core this is not new, because ISO/SAE 21434 already requires confirming the validity of the claims and of the requirements on the operational environment. The TR just makes it impossible to overlook.

The TR also shows how broad the field is. Assumptions can relate to the attack feasibility rating, the impact rating, the vehicle, another item, human behavior, or measures not implemented by E/E systems.

The examples are correspondingly down to earth.

The assumption that “the user manual includes a reminder that the PIN has to be changed regularly” is validated by reading the user manual. The assumption about the physical location of a component is checked against the mechanical drawings. Unspectacular, but these are exactly the checks that are often missing.

One important addition: the evidence may come from other disciplines. Cybersecurity then only has to obtain the result, not generate it. How collaboration with functional safety can work, for example, is something we discuss in our article Functional Safety and Cybersecurity.

What helps is a claims list that is set up early, extended over the lifecycle, and re-evaluated regularly, for example monthly. Where assumptions come from is shown in our article on the ISO/SAE 21434 item definition.

5. Who Verifies and Who Validates Is Set Out in the Interface Agreement

“The supplier verifies, the OEM validates.” This rule of thumb seems to persist stubbornly, but the TR does not support it.

V&V activities can be performed by a customer, a supplier, or other parties, according to the cybersecurity interface agreement. That includes the information exchange each party needs in order to fulfill its part.

Four passages in the TR are particularly relevant for the supply chain:

  • Disclose TARA assumptions: If the customer’s TARA relies on certain properties of the component, for example that a control makes an attack more difficult, the customer can share this expectation with the supplier. The supplier then knows what to provide evidence for.
  • Use supplier evidence: A strategy can rely on evidence provided by the supplier. The customer provides the information needed for that.
  • Out-of-context: The supplier verifies against assumed requirements, which can be considered equivalent to verification against agreed requirements. At integration, the supplier’s assumptions are confirmed. If one is not valid, both parties jointly agree on how to proceed.
  • Existing and off-the-shelf components: Missing evidence can be compensated for by blackbox tests, monitoring results, or inspection of the configuration. For off-the-shelf components there is no agreement covering development, but one for the post-development phase can be useful.

For the planning part, the corresponding section names the points that should be agreed: distribution of activities, testing scope, communication, making work products available, and handling of findings.

Another important note: at handover, a frozen baseline of work products is expected, but a finding after handover can affect the other party.

Our advice: align the interface agreement early and use it internally between teams as well. How risks remain traceable in the TARA across system boundaries is described in our article Hey, Vertical TARA Integration! Why We Need to Link Cyber Risk Analyses Across System Boundaries.

6. A Justified Mix of Methods Instead of a Pentest as an Alibi for Everything

ISO/SAE TR 8477 lists eleven method groups for V&V activities, deliberately without ranking, hierarchy, or mandatory selection.

It does, however, expect a rationale for the selection.

As possible bases, it names:

  • the cybersecurity assurance level (CAL for short) according to ISO/SAE PAS 8475,
  • an argument as to why the set of methods minimizes the possibility of unidentified vulnerabilities,
  • organizational rules and guidelines,
  • or coverage by the same method at a higher architectural layer, in which case the method can be omitted at lower layers.

This ties in with ISO/SAE 21434, which recommends testing for unidentified vulnerabilities, requires a rationale if such testing is not performed, and likewise requires a rationale for the selected validation activities. The TR now supplies the vocabulary for these rationales.

It is striking how much weight the TR gives to the “quiet” methods: review, inspection, analysis, and gap analysis dominate the example tables in Clause 7. Tests are more the exception there. The TR also names the limits of individual methods. Formal methods are one example: they can prove mathematically that certain classes of bugs do not occur in a piece of software, because unlike a test they consider all execution paths. The effort involved, however, is so high that this is usually only worthwhile for relatively simple components. And the proof is only as good as the specification it is run against: if the specification is incomplete, it proves the wrong thing.

What such a strategy can look like in concrete terms is also described in Chapter 9 of the specialist publication 1000 Things Worth Knowing in Automotive Cybersecurity.

Three recommendations from it:

  • one joint V&V strategy for all disciplines instead of a separate security document,
  • define the verification method as an attribute when the requirement is written and have the tester confirm it in review,
  • do not drop security tests under time pressure.

If author and tester disagree about the method, it is usually a sign of a misunderstood requirement. At that point, the correction is still cheap.

7. A Finding Is Only Closed Once It Has Reached the TARA and the Cybersecurity Case

The work is not done with the test result. What counts is what happens to the findings afterward: who evaluates them, who fixes them, and how the result is re-checked. The TR explicitly names the management of findings and deviations as part of planning and makes clear that a finding is analyzed and managed to closure.

ISO/SAE 21434 governs this in Clauses 8 and 10: weaknesses from development are documented, examined for exploitability in the vulnerability analysis, and assessed and treated in vulnerability management. Only then does it become clear whether a finding merely triggers a fix or also changes the TARA.

For reporting, ISO/SAE TR 8477 helps in Clause 8.1 with a clear structure:

  1. Traceability: target, references to strategy, plan, requirements, test specification, and test environment
  2. Scope: layer of integration, approach (whitebox, greybox, blackbox), pass/fail criteria, exclusions with rationale
  3. Results and findings: overall result, detailed results, inputs to an attack feasibility rating, proposals on how to address a finding
  4. Deviations from the plan and their resolution
  5. Conclusion

The inconspicuous item “inputs to an attack feasibility rating” is the real lever. It turns a test report into a contribution to the TARA. The TR is also pragmatic about format: a verification report can cover several disciplines as long as the cybersecurity-relevant contents are labeled, and references to existing work products are better than duplicated content.

In the end, the report is the evidence that the cybersecurity case refers to and that the assessment judges.

If results remain open or tests fail, an impact analysis on goals and requirements is needed. If the risk is acceptable, the argument for approval is documented.

Reality Check: What Does ISO/SAE TR 8477 Mean for Automotive Pentesting?

We all know that paper is patient. So how does the TR fit with what actually happens in automotive pentesting practice? Three observations from everyday consulting practice, each with the passage in the TR that has something to say about it.

Observation 1: The Pentest Comes Too Late and Stands Alone

The pattern is familiar. The pentest is scheduled shortly before SOP because the system is then as mature as possible. That is understandable. But if the pentest is the only validation method, findings are practically guaranteed. Then the search for time and budget begins, and in the worst case the schedule starts to wobble.

The TR offers two ways out that complement each other:

  1. Early validation steps based on preliminary results.
  2. A V&V strategy with several methods and a plan for handling findings.

Teams that take both seriously experience the pentest as a confirmation, not a surprise. The misconception behind it is also named in Chapter 9 of 1000 Things Worth Knowing in Automotive Cybersecurity: treating a pentest as proof of security. In fact, it is a snapshot.

Observation 2: Findings Remain an Island

The pentest report arrives, the critical findings are fixed, the report goes into the archive. What is missing is the way back into the system: Which assumptions in the TARA were wrong? Which attack feasibility rating needs to be adjusted? Which cybersecurity goal is affected?

ISO/SAE TR 8477 describes exactly this feedback loop:

  • A finding triggers updates of work products.
  • The report contains inputs to the attack feasibility rating.

A pentest result is therefore more than a list of defects. It is a measurement of the quality of your own risk analysis.

Observation 3: “Please Work Through These Test Cases”

It is often expected that a pentest consists of a fixed list of test cases with a clear yes or no. Test cases are part of it. But the TR describes the pentest more broadly: as a practical evaluation from an attacker’s point of view that checks for both the presence and the exploitability of vulnerabilities. Within the agreed scope, it can use any method, from fuzzing to reverse engineering to developing its own exploit.

Or in the words of the TR: “Penetration testing can include automated tools, manual techniques and creative work.”

Another statement in the TR fits with this: validation methods can be flexible and adaptive, and predefined acceptance criteria are not always available in advance.

The TR suggests managing this through documented assumptions and intermediate reports.

For commissioning a test, this means that instead of a list of test cases, what is needed is a clear scope, ethical and procedural boundaries, and an agreed approach to findings. For this, the TR also points to codes of conduct and coordinated disclosure processes.

When tailoring the test, it pays to align the scope with the expected gain in insight. Purely theoretical attacks and findings with negligible impact add little. Blackbox is realistic but can miss things. Greybox balances efficiency and realism. Whitebox is efficient and well suited to checking attack feasibility ratings.

A Quick Self-Check for Your Project

Five questions that are easier to ask with the TR behind you:

  • Does your V&V strategy state what the pentest is supposed to show and why exactly this method was chosen?
  • Which validation activities have already taken place before the pentest?
  • Does the test team know the controls and assumptions your TARA relies on?
  • Has it been clarified before testing starts who evaluates findings, who fixes them, and by when?
  • Do the results flow back into the TARA, the cybersecurity case, and lessons learned?

If you hesitate here, you do not have a testing problem but a planning problem.

Why that is so often the case is also described in this article on automotive pentesting and the question of the right timing: Security in Vehicle Testing: Why We Need to Take Automotive Pentesting More Seriously (Even After SOP!).

Conclusion: ISO/SAE TR 8477 – No New Obligations, but Finally a Common Yardstick

ISO/SAE TR 8477:2026 does not reinvent V&V. Much of it is already contained in ISO/SAE 21434 in the same or a similar form, such as the validation of claims at vehicle level. The value of the TR lies elsewhere: it gives the industry a common language and takes away the basis for a few convenient excuses.

Its limits should be understood. The TR sets no requirements and recommends no methods. The examples in Clause 7 remain superficial in places, and for carrying out individual methods you have to turn to SAE J3322.

Anyone looking for step-by-step instructions will not find them here.

Anyone who wants to revise their V&V strategy, on the other hand, now has a reference that development, test team, supplier, and assessor can all refer to equally.

Our advice: take your own strategy, put Clause 5 next to it, and check which questions remain open.

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